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TAKING IT ALL OFF: SALAZAR V. BUTTERBALL AND THE
BATTLE OVER FAIR COMPENSATION UNDER THE FLSA's
"CHANGING CLOTHES" PROVISION
INTRODUCTION
Immigrant workers are a mainstay in American industries that rely
on minimum-wage, low-skill labor as a key component to their economic
viability.' Immigrants are often more willing to take menial jobs than
low-skilled workers bom in the United States, and they are also more
likely to take jobs in sectors of the economy that U.S.-born workers have
largely vacated over the last few decades.2 These low-wage jobs are
abundant in sectors such as construction, manufacturing, and the hospi-
tality industry, and they often involve strenuous and repetitive labor.3
One of the industries that depends most on the presence of an inexpen-
sive immigrant workforce is the meat-packing industry, especially poul-
try processing.4 The work at meatpacking plants adds another dimension
to the everyday challenges faced by other low-wage workers-not only
is meatpacking inherently messy and unpleasant, but it poses many seri-
ous risks to the health and safety of employees.'
Salazar v. Butterball, L.L.C.,6 is a case about a group of these low-
wage meatpacking employees demanding payment for the time they
spend each day putting on and taking off (donning and doffing) required
safety equipment. While the meatpacking industry has come a long way
from the unsettling practices depicted in Upton Sinclair's The Jungle,
abuses of power continue to take place in this industry that illuminate
how far employers and courts still need to go in order to ensure that all
employees receive fair pay and adequate safety precautions.
This Comment explores the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Salazar, in
which the Tenth Circuit rejects the idea that workers should be paid for
time spent donning and doffing personal protective equipment (PPE)
because it falls under the "changing clothes" exclusion of section
§ 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Part I describes the
I. Gordon Hanson, Two Very Different Groups Seeking Work, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009,
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/the-competition-for-low-wage-jobs/.
2. Id.; Michael Fix, Moving to Where the Jobs Are, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009,
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/the-competition-for-low-wage-jobs/.
3. Fix, supra note 2.
4. Pamela Constable, Immigrant Workers Vital, Va. Firms Say Poultry Industry Seeks Better
U.S. Screening to Cull Illegal Applicants, Avert Fines, WASH. POST, July 13, 2008, at C01.
5. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR: WORKERS' RIGHTS IN U.S. MEAT
AND POULTRY PLANTS 24 (2004) (noting that nearly every worker interviewed for the report had
suffered some kind of serious injury while working at a meat or poultry plant).
6. 644 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2011).
7. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906).
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landscape of the modem meatpacking industry, explains the employee
protections of the FLSA and the confusion courts have created in their
attempts to define "work" and "changing clothes" under the FLSA and
the Portal-to-Portal Act, and examines the challenges faced by the De-
partment of Labor (DOL) in enforcing the FLSA under this chaotic judi-
cial framework. Part II outlines the facts, procedural history, opinion, and
amicus curiae briefs of Salazar. Part III offers a critique of the opinion
and its approach to the issues, and it concludes that Congress should re-
vise the FLSA in light of the recent circuit split over how to correctly
interpret the Portal-to-Portal Act and that the DOL should use notice and
comment procedures to secure Chevron deference for its interpretation of
"changing clothes." Congress and the DOL must take legally binding
action to ensure the protection employee rights under the FLSA in the
modem workplace.
I. BACKGROUND
The main issue in Salazar is whether or not PPE should be defined
as "clothing" for purposes of excluding the donning and doffing of PPE
from compensable work under the FLSA, also known as the federal min-
imum wage statute. The FLSA does not require an employer to pay its
employees for time spent "changing clothes or washing at the beginning
or end of each workday" if noncompensation for these activities is an
express or implied term of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). 9
The other issue in the case is whether donning and doffing can be con-
sidered "work" under the FLSA, although the court chooses not to ad-
dress this issue.' 0 While payment for donning and doffing PPE may seem
like a straightforward issue of statutory interpretation for the courts, the
legal standards for analyzing this issue are actually incredibly confusing
and not well defined.
A. PPE and the Modern Meat-Packing Industry
The technological advances in mechanized manufacturing at the
turn of the twentieth century turned meatpacking into one of the most
dangerous industries in the United States." According to the United
States Department of Labor (DOL), thousands of employees are injured
while on the job at animal slaughtering and meatpacking plants every
year, making these jobs among the most hazardous in America today.12
As a result, the safety standards for this industry require employers to
8. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1133.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006).
10. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1136 & n.3.
I1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 11.
12. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INDUSTRY INJURY AND
ILLNESS DATA (2009), http://www.bls.gov/iifloshwc/osh/os/ostb2423.pdf.
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provide their workers with PPE to reduce the incidence of on-the-job
illness and injury.13
The Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), an
arm of the DOL, is charged with enforcing the right of all employees to a
safe workplace. "OSHA requires the use of personal protective equip-
ment (PPE) to reduce employee exposure to hazards when engineering
and administrative controls are not feasible or effective in reducing these
exposures to acceptable levels."l 4 Employers are required to evaluate
their workplace to determine whether PPE will reduce the risk of injury
to their employees."
OSHA has identified multiple hazards that may require PPE at the
two main stages of poultry processing.16 The first stage of processing is
when the birds are grown and prepared for slaughter, and the second
stage is the actual slaughter, butchering, and packaging of the birds.' 7
The major hazards of the first stage are related to airborne toxins and
particulates, many of which stem from bird feces.' 8 The hazards at the
second stage include those associated with large machinery, knives, and
slippery working areas.' 9 Many of these hazards are unavoidable, espe-
cially because most PPE cannot completely protect workers from all of
the "blood, grease, animal feces, ingesta (food from the animal's diges-
tive system), and other detrius from the animals they slaughter." 20 There
are no specific OSHA standards for poultry processing, but all plants
must meet the minimum standards for general safety areas such as sanita-
tion, machine guarding, and knife safety.2 1
While these standards are extremely important to protecting the
health and safety of poultry workers, many of these workers still suffer
from hand and wrist injuries and repetitive task-related pain conditions,
such as carpal tunnel.22 One journalist summarized these more subtle
dangers in a 2002 article:
Tasks involve repetitive movements (workers sometimes perform the
same motion 30,000 times a shift), and knife-wielding employees
work perilously close together as they struggle to keep up with the
13. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132 (2011).
14. OSHA Safety and Health Topics: Personal and Protective Equipment (PPE),
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/
personalprotectiveequipment/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
15. Id.
16. OSHA Safety and Health Topics: Poultry Processing, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH




20. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 40.
21. OSHA Safety and Health Topics: Poultry Processing, supra note 16.
22. Peter St. Onge et al., The Cruelest Cuts: An Epidemic of Pain, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Sept. 30, 2008, at 15A.
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production line. [OSHA] statistics for 2000 reveal that one out of
every seven poultry workers was injured on the job, more than dou-
ble the average for all private industries. Poultry workers are also 14
times more likely to suffer debilitating injuries stemming from repeti-
tive trauma-like "claw hand" (in which the injured fingers lock in a
curled position) and ganglionic cysts (fluid deposits under the skin).23
Employers also put a huge amount of pressure on workers to max-
imize the volume of animals that go through processing by increasing the
speed of the processing line. 2 4 The speed of production lines is directly
related to injuries, but there are no state or federal laws that limit line
speed.2 5 A 2002 investigative article in the Denver Post described the
experiences of workers at the Swift & Co. meatpacking plant in Greeley,
Colorado, who could barely move after finishing a day of work at the
plant because they were "exhausted from working on a line that turns
live animals into processed meat as fast as six times a minute."26 Work-
ers also told the Denver Post that "supervisors apply constant pressure to
keep the line moving" because of the company's financial goals:
[A] world in which they are driven, sometimes insulted and humiliat-
ed, to keep the plant's production up. "From the time you enter,
you're told that if the plant stops 10 minutes, the company will lose I
don't know how many millions of dollars," said Maria Lilia Almaraz,
who earns $10.60 an hours cutting bones from cuts of meat with a ra-
zor-sharp blade. "It's always, faster, faster," she said. 27
OSHA issued more restrictive regulations concernmg ergonomic
standards in January 2001 in an effort to reduce the debilitating injuries
caused by the repetitive motions required for tasks like deboning and
cutting.28 However, Congress and President George W. Bush struck
down the standards just two months later amid pressure from large cor-
porations who argued that the standards were based on insufficient scien-
tific and medical understanding. 2 9 OSHA now relies on voluntary adher-
*30ence to ergonomics guidelines.
The PPE generally required for work in a poultry processing plant
includes "frocks, aprons, plastic sleeves, gloves, cotton glove liners,
23. Nicholas Stein, Son of a Chicken Man: As He Struggles to Remake His Family's Poultry
Business into a $24 Billion Meat Behemoth, John Tyson Must Prove He Has More to Offer than the
Family Name, FORTUNE, May 13, 2002, at 136.
24. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 33.
25. Id.
26. Id at 34 (quoting Michael Riley, Woes at Swift Blamed on Pace, Speed Valued Above All
Else, Workers Say, DENVER POST, Nov. 26, 2002, at Al).
27. Id
28. St. Onge et al., supra note 22.
29. OSHA's Ergonomics Regulation, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
http://www.uschamber.com/issues/labor/oshas-ergonomics-regulation (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
30. St. Onge et al., supra note 22.
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boots or overshoes, hard hats, earplugs, and safety glasses." 31 Employees
that work in deboning and evisceration, the departments that perform the
actual dismembering of the dead birds, also wear mesh gloves, knife
holders, and arm guards to protect themselves from knife and scissor
injuries.32 While payment for donning and doffing time amounts to a
minimal amount each day (around twenty minutes), these wages can add
up to around $500 a year per employee.33 According to expert Robert G.
Radwin, the average amount of daily donning and doffing before and
after shifts, including one meal break per employee, is approximately
16,858 minutes for an average-sized plant. 34
Another major issue in the modem meatpacking industry is its reli-
ance on immigrant labor, both legal and undocumented.35 Many of the
employer abuses that take place in the industry are directly linked to the
vulnerability of these workers and employer willingness to take ad-
vantage of these weaknesses.36 While many undocumented workers are
afraid to assert their rights because they fear deportation, workers who
are in the country legally are also unwilling to stand up to employers for
fear that their fellow workers who are not yet legal will suffer the conse-
quences.3 1 Major poultry production plants, including Tyson Foods, deny
that they hire undocumented workers purposely, although many compa-
nies often find workers though what industry researchers call "ethnic
network recruitment," where companies promise to secure jobs for the
family members of current workers.
B. The FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act
In 1938, Congress enacted the FLSA "to establish nationwide min-
imum wage and maximum hours standards."39 The most important provi-
sions of the FLSA require that employees be paid a minimum wage and
be paid at an overtime rate for any hours they work over the standard
forty-hour workweek.40 Congress created the FLSA as a way to protect
covered workers against unfair wages and unreasonable hours, two sig-
nificant labor concerns that had been exacerbated by the economic tur-
31. Salazar v. Butterball, L.L.C., 644 F.3d 1130, 1134 (10th Cir. 2011).
32. Id.
33. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1134; Steven Greenhouse, Poultry Plants to Pay Workers $10 Mil-
lion in Compensation, NY TIMES, May 10, 2002, at A20.
34. Phase I Expert Report of Robert G. Radwin, Ph.D.for Plaintiffs, Salazar v. Butterball,
LLC, No. 08-CV-02071-MSK-CBS, 2009 WL 6048979 (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2009), 2009 WL
29155833.
35. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 106.
36. Id. at 101; Annette Bernhardt, Expect More Workplace Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2009, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/the-competition-for-low-wage-jobs/.
37. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 103.
38. Id. at 109-10.
39. Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 508 U.S. 22, 25 (1993).
40. Salazar v. Butterball, L.L.C., 644 F.3d 1130, 1135 (10th Cir. 2011).
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moil of the Great Depression.4 1 Congress also sought to prevent all labor
conditions that were "detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being
of workers.'A2
The FLSA gives employees a private right of action to recover
earned but unpaid wages from their employers.43 The FLSA allows
courts to award any owed back pay as well as any attorney fees and costs
incurred by the employee while pursuing their FLSA claim.44
Employees also have the right to pursue FLSA claims as a class if
the employees are "similarly situated.A'
The Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of the DOL routinely reports
that 70% or more of the businesses it investigates are not in compliance
with the minimum wage requirements of the FLSA.46 The WHD is the
sole enforcer of the FLSA, and it responds only to complaints that em-
ployers are not in compliance with the Act. In 2008 alone, the WHD
collected over $185 million in back wages for 228,000 employees based
on almost 24,000 complaints.47 However, this is likely only the tip of the
iceberg in terms of earned wages that employers do not pay to employees
every year. The Employer Policy Foundation, an employer-supported
think tank, estimated in 2004 that workers would receive an additional
$19 billion annually if their employers complied fully with the FLSA.48
Under the FLSA, employers must pay employees for all "hours
worked." There are two main issues in Salazar and other donning and
doffing cases, and there are circuit splits with regard to both issues. The
first is whether time spent donning and doffing PPE and time spent walk-
ing to the production line after donning and doffing PPE constitutes
"work" under the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act, and the second is
whether PPE are clothes for purposes of the exclusion provided by
§ 203(o). In Salazar, the Tenth Circuit focuses its opinion on determin-
ing whether PPE are clothes because the employer in that case entered
into a CBA with the union representing its employees, thus implicating
§ 203(o).4 9 However, the larger and more complex issue is whether don-
41. Danuta Bembenista Panich & Christopher C. Murray, Back on the Cutting Edge: "Don-
ning-and-Doffing" Litigation Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 58-APR. FED. LAW. 14, 14
(2011).
42. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981).
43. Panich & Murray, supra note 41, at 14.
44. Id. at 15.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Collects over 1.4 Billion in Back
Wages for over 2 Million Employees Since Fiscal Year 2001, at 2 (2008),
www.dol.gov/whd/statistics/2008FiscalYear.pdf [hereinafter 2008 WHD Report] (FY 2008: 78%
violation rate); see also U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division 2002 Statistics Fact
Sheet, www.dol.gov/whd/statistics/200212.htm (FY 2002: approximately 70% violation rate).
47. 2008 WHD Report, supra note 46, at 1.
48. Craig Becker, A Good Job for Everyone, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 6, 2004, at 1.
49. Salazar v. Butterball, L.L.C., 644 F.3d 1130, 1136 (10th Cir. 2011).
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ning and doffing is "work," a question that has created a separate and
more problematic circuit split.
1. Defining "Work" and "Workday" Under the FLSA
The FLSA does not define "work" or "workweek," so the Supreme
Court has developed its own definitions of these terms to assist in its
interpretation of the statute.o The Court's first attempt at defining
"work" came in 1944 in Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Lo-
cal No. 123." The Court held in Tennessee Coal that it had no reason to
assume that Congress meant for the definition of work to be anything
other than its generally accepted meaning, "physical or mental exertion
(whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and
pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his
business."52
The Court again defined "work" and "workweek" broadly in Ander-
son v. Mt. Clemens Pottery, Co. 53 by holding that the "workweek" in-
cluded "all time during which an employee is necessarily required to be
on the employer's premises, on duty or at a prescribed workplace."54 The
Court also held that preliminary activities done solely on the employer's
premises that are a "necessary prerequisite to productive work" also con-
stitute work for purposes of the FLSA.5 5 These preliminary activities
could include tasks such as putting on aprons or overalls, turning on ma-
chines, and sharpening tools. 5 6
However, the court also created an exception to the requirement that
preliminary activities be compensated-any activity that was de minimis
could be excluded from an employee's workday.57 The Court defined this
de minimis exception in the following way: "When the matter in issue
concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the scheduled
working hours . . . such trifles may be disregarded[, for) [s]plit-second
absurdities are not justified by the actualities or working conditions or by
the policy of the [FLSA]."5 The Court has not established a test for de-
termining when an activity is de minimis, leading courts to apply the idea
in a variety of ways.59
50. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944)
("[W]e are not guided by any precise statutory definition of work or employment.").
51. 321 U.S. 590, 591-92 (1944).
52. Id. at 598.
53. 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
54. Id. at 690-91 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 693.
56. Id. at 692-93.
57. Id. at 692.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Frank v. Wilson & Co., 172 F.2d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 1949) (holding that 9.2
minutes per day consisting of 6.2 minutes of walking time and 3 minutes of other preliminary activi-
ties is considered de minimis); Green v. Planters Nut & Chocolate Co., 177 F.2d 187, 188 (4th Cir.
1949) (de minimis rule applied to employees who reported up to ten minutes before start of shift to
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In 1947, Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal Acts in response to
the Supreme Court's decision in Anderson and the cases that followed its
reasoning, which Congress viewed as interpreting the FLSA in a way
that disregarded "long-established customs, practices, and contracts be-
tween employers and employees, thereby creating wholly unexpected
liabilities" that would "bring about the financial ruin of many employ-
ers."61 The key provision of the Portal-to-Portal Act is § 254(a), which
provides that employers cannot be liable under the FLSA for not com-
pensating employees for two categories of activities: "(1) walking, rid-
mg, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the prin-
cipal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform,
and (2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said princi-
pal activity or activities." 62
The Supreme Court has interpreted the term "principal activities" as
requiring compensation for any activities performed before or after a
regular work shift where those activities are "an integral and indispensa-
ble part of the principal activities for which covered workmen are em-
ployed."63 The Court has not specifically stated what activities should be
considered integral and indispensable, but it has declined to alter the test
articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Alvarez v. IBP, 6 which held that an
activity is only integral and indispensable when it is "necessary to the
principal work performed and done for the benefit of the employer."65
The Ninth Circuit referred to this definition to as the bipartite Steiner
test.66
Integral and indispensable activities must also be understood within
the context of the continuous workday rule.6 7 The "workday" is "the pe-
riod between the commencement and completion on the same workday
of an employee's principal activity or activities."6 8 The DOL limited the
application of the Portal-to-Portal Act using the idea of a definable be-
ginning and end to the workday:
[T]o the extent that activities engaged in by an employee occur after
the employee commences to perform the first principal activity on a
check in and prepare for work); McIntyre v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons Co., 72 F. Supp. 366, 372
(W.D. Ky. 1947) (ten to twenty minutes per day going to locker, exchanging uniform, changing
uniform, and reporting to foreman within de minimis rule); Lasater v. Hercules Powder Co., 73 F.
Supp. 264, 271 (E.D. Tenn. 1947) (changing clothes and preliminary preparations for work were de
minimis, although not stating the amount of time preliminary activities took).
60. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (2011).
61. Id. at §251(a).
62. Id. at § 254(a).
63. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956) (emphasis added).
64. 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003).
65. Id. at 902-03 (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 750 F.2d 47, 50 (8th
Cir. 1984)); see also Dunlop v. City Elec., Inc., 527 F.2d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 1976)).
66. Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 903.




particular workday and before he ceases the performance of the last
principal activity on a particular workday, the provisions of [§
254(a)] have no application. 69
Under the continuous workday rule, the commencement of the
workday can cause activities that might otherwise be considered non-
compensable, preliminary activities to function as compensable, princi-
pal activities under the FLSA.70
In 2005, the Supreme Court further broadened this limitation on the
Portal-to-Portal Act by explicitly holding that any post-donning and pre-
doffing walking time, which occurs in most workplaces during the walk
from a locker room to a production area, would be compensable under
the Portal-to-Portal Act, assuming the initial donning and doffing was an
"integral and indispensable activity." 7 1 Although the Portal-to-Portal Act
specifically excludes preliminary activities and walking time from com-
pensation, the continuous workday rule requires that employers compen-
sate their employees for these activities when they occur between the
first and last principal activities of each day. The exclusions of § 254(a)
of the Portal-to-Portal Act have largely been eroded in the in a workplace
where employees must use PPE because of the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion that donning and doffing can be "integral and indispensable" and
therefore not "preliminary or postliminary."7 2
Under this new framework that recognizes the potential for donning
and doffing to be principal activities, the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits have held that employers do not need to compensate their
employees for donning and doffing "non-unique" or generic PPE, even if
employees are required to wear such gear by their employers or by gov-
ernment regulations. The Third and the District Court of Maryland in
the Fourth Circuit have held that employers must compensate employees
for donning and doffing PPE when it is required by an employer or gov-
ernment regulation, making the donning and doffing integral and indis-
pensable to the work performed by the employees.74
69. Id. at § 790.6(a).
70. See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 620 (6th Cir. 2010).
71. IBP Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 36 (2005).
72. Id. at 21.
73. See Von Friewalde v. Boeing Aerospace Operations, Inc., 339 F. App'x 448,454 (5th Cir.
2009) (holding that donning and doffing generic safety gear is de minimis); Pirant v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 542 F.3d 202, 208 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that donning and doffing uniform shirt, gloves, and
work shoes is not integral and indispensable); Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586,
594 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that safety gear can be indispensable to an employee's principal activi-
ties without being integral, even if required by law and the employer); Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d
894, 903 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that donning and doffing non-unique PPE, such as hard hats and
safety goggles, is not compensable because it is de minimis, even though it is integral and indispen-
sable), affd, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
74. See DeAsencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 500 F.3d 361, 372 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that
employer requirement that employees don PPE mainly benefitted employer); Perez v. Mountaire
Farms, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 670, 679-80 (D. Md. 2009) (noting that donning and doffing PPE is
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The Tenth Circuit has taken a different approach, using the Tennes-
see Coal definition of work as "physical exertion" to hold in Reich v.
IBP, Inc.," that the FLSA only requires compensation for donning and
doffing protective gear that requires time, exertion and concentration to
don and doff.7 6 At least one district court in the Tenth Circuit has ques-
tioned the continuing viability of the Reich test.7 7
2. The Changing Clothes Exception/Exclusion Under § 203(o)
Congress amended the FLSA yet again in 1949, giving further con-
cessions to employers who were unhappy with the repercussions of the
FLSA.x One major addition to the FLSA during this amendment period
was 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). 79 Section 203(o) limits what activities may be
excluded from an employee's "hours worked" if a collective bargaining
relationship exists in the workplace:
In determining for the purposes of sections 206 and 207 of this title
the hours for which an employee is employed, there shall be excluded
any time spent in changing clothes or washing at the beginning or
end of each workday which was excluded from measured working
time during the week involved by the express terms of or by custom
or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement appli-
cable to the particular employee.80
In simpler terms, § 203(o) only applies if two conditions are met:
(1) the items worn by employees are "clothes," and (2) there is an ex-
press or implied term in the CBA that excludes "changing clothes" from
compensation. This provision adds another layer to the FLSA that insu-
lates employers and recognizes their ability to bargain or use a custom or
practice such that they would not have to pay employees for the prepara-
tory activities of changing clothes or washing, even if those activities are
"principal activities" under the Portal-to-Portal Act. However, the Sixth
Circuit has held that changing clothes may be excluded by § 203(o) but
still function as a principal activity that starts the workday.
Section 203(o) can serve as a loophole for employers, especially if
an employer can argue that non-payment for donning and doffing is an
implied term of a CBA, because it allows employers to use the process of
collective bargaining over the issue (or lack thereof) to justify non-
done not merely for the convenience of the employee and that it is necessarily for employer's bene-
fit).
75. 38 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 1994).
76. Id. at 1126.
77. Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 474 F.Supp.2d 1240, 1246 (D. Kan. 2007) (noting that the
Tenth Circuit "did not analyze the issues through the lens of the continuous workday rule as clarified
by the Supreme Court in Alvarez").
78. Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 958 (11th Cir. 2007).
79. Id.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2011).
81. Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 619-20 (6th Cir. 2010).
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payment for an activity that is otherwise compensable work in several
circuits.8 2 The circuits are split as to whether § 203(o) is an exemption
for employers, which must be narrowly read in favor of an employee, or
whether it is merely an exclusion that works to remove certain tasks from
compensable hours and does not require a narrow reading.83 The Su-
preme Court has yet to consider this issue or the meaning of "changing
clothes" under § 203(o), and both questions in Salazar were issues of
first impression for the Tenth Circuit.
C Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.
In 2003, the Ninth Circuit issued a controversial opinion in Alvarez
v. IBP, Inc., interpreting the meaning of "changing clothes" under FLSA
§ 203(o). In Alvarez, the Ninth Circuit held that unionized employers
should be required to compensate employees for the time they spend
donning and doffing PPE, even where there is an express or implied
CBA term excluding this activity from compensation, because PPE are
not "clothes" for the purposes of § 203(o).85 The Ninth Circuit also ad-
dressed the important threshold issue of whether donning and doffing
PPE is a principal activity that is integral and indispensable to the work
done at the IBP plant.86
In Alvarez, the Ninth Circuit examined the payment practices of IBP
(formerly known as Iowa Beef Packers), the world's largest producer of
fresh beef and pork.87 Unionized employees at one of IBP's Washington
"kill and processing" plants brought a claim under the FLSA alleging
that IBP was not compensating them for time spent donning PPE at the
beginning of each shift, donning and doffing during their 30-minute un-
paid meal breaks, and doffing PPE at the end of each shift.88 IBP paid its
workers according to a "gang time pay" scheme, under which employees
are only paid during times when they are actually cutting and bagging
meat.89 This means employees are paid starting when the first piece of
meat hits the processing line and ending when the last piece of meat is
packaged. 90
82. See DeAsencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 500 F.3d 361, 372 (3d Cir. 2007); Alvarez v. IBP,
Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that donning and doffing unique PPE is compensa-
ble); Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 670, 679-80 (D. Md. 2009).
83. Compare Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1138 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding §
203(o) is not an exemption.), and Allen v. McWane, Inc., 593 F.3d 449,458 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding
§ 203(o) is a definition and not an affirmative defense, so employee had the burden of proving a
custom or practice existed), and Franklin, 619 F.3d at 612 (same), and Anderson, 488 F.3d at 957
(holding § 203(o) is a definition and not an affirmative defense), with Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 905
(holding § 203(o) is an exemption and must be read narrowly).
84. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1136.
85. Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 897.
86. Id at 904.
87. Id. at 898.
88. Id. at 900.
89. Id. at 900-1.
90. See id. at 901.
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The Ninth Circuit first analyzed the issue of whether donning and
doffing is compensable work using what it described as "Steiner's bipar-
tite 'integral and indispensable test,"' which requires employers to pay
employees for activities that are "necessary to the principal work per-
formed and done for the benefit of the employer." 91 The court held that
donning and doffing required PPE satisfies this test. 92 The court reasoned
that because the PPE "is required by law, by rules of [JBP], [and] by the
nature of the work," the donning and doffing of the PPE is necessary to
the principal work performed. It also held that the donning and doffing
was done for the benefit of IBP to allow it to satisfy its requirements
under OSHA's federal regulations to prevent injury, as well as prevent-
ing contamination of the meat products themselves.93 While the court
held that non-unique items of PPE, such as hardhats and earplugs, and
unique items of PPE, like Kevlar gloves, are both integral and indispen-
sable to the workers' duties at the meatpacking plant, the court ultimately
concluded that employers need not compensate employees for donning
and doffing non-unique items of PPE because the time it takes to do so is
de inmnus.94
The court then addressed the issue of whether PPE should be con-
sidered "clothes" for purposes of § 203(o). The court noted that PPE
does not "plainly and unmistakeably" fit within the meaning of
§ 203(o)'s "clothing" exception, and that the definition of clothing
should be construed against the employer seeking to assert the excep-
tion. 95
Perhaps the most important observation of the Ninth Circuit was
that specialized protective gear is different from normal clothing because
it "provides a barrier against exposure to workplace hazards."96 The court
also referenced the distinction between normal clothes and PPE drawn by
OSHA that "general work clothes (e.g. uniforms, pants, shirts or blouses)
not intended to function as protection against a hazard are not considered
to be personal protective equipment."97 The court used these distinctions
to affirm the district court's ruling that § 203(o) does not apply to the
donning and doffing of PPE.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, but only on
the issue of whether the time employees spend walking between the
changing area and the production area is compensable under the FLSA.99
91. Id. at 903.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 904.
95. Id. at 905 (citing Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)).
96. Id at 905.
97. Id. at 905 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(b)).
98. Id. at 905.
99. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 24 (2005).
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However, the Court did recognize the possibility that donning and doff-
ing can function as principal activities when it held that walking time is
not excluded by the Portal-to-Portal Act if it occurs after an integral and
indispensable activity triggers the workday.'" This possibility that don-
ning a required uniform or other safety equipment could initiate the con-
tinuous workday has led to a new flood of FLSA claims, filed by workers
from many industries, including workers from foundries and nuclear
power plants as well as security guards and police officers. 0 ' More than
one hundred "donning and doffing" claims have been filed since the Su-
preme Court's 2005 decision in IBP.10 2
D. Multi-Million Dollar Settlements in Perdue Farms and In re Tyson
Foods
While the DOL is still pursuing more effective strategies for enforc-
ing the FLSA, it has had some past success in securing back pay for em-
ployees that were not compensated for donning and doffing PPE through
settlement agreements. 0 3 The DOL negotiated multi-million dollar set-
tlements for poultry plant workers in Trotter v. Perdue Farms, Inc. 10 and
more recently in In re Tyson Foods Inc. Fair Labor Standards Act
Litig.o105
In Perdue Farms, the DOL, under the guidance of the Clinton Ad-
ministration, pursued a claim against Perdue Farms, a poultry processing
factory, in an attempt to get poultry companies to compensate workers
for donning and doffing time after years of resistance.10 6 The poultry
companies argued that donning and doffing should be considered part of
the employees' personal time, but the DOL viewed it as a task related
directly to enforcement of workplace safety.10 7 The DOL negotiated a
settlement with Perdue under which it was to distribute $10 million to
25,000 former and current workers. 0 8 One attorney for the DOL estimat-
ed that workers at Perdue spent about eight minutes a day donning and
doffing their PPE, which totaled about $500 worth of unpaid work per
year.109 The settlement covered a two-year period of non-compensation,
meaning many Perdue workers received over $1,000 in back pay." 0 The
back pay also went to undocumented immigrants who worked for Per-
100. Id. at 37.
101. Panich & Murray, supra note 41, at 76.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., In re Tyson Foods Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1370 (M.D. Ga. 2011); Stipula-
tion and Agreement of Settlement at 12, Trotter v. Perdue Farms, Inc., No. CIV.A.99-893-MPT (D.
Del. Aug. 5, 2002), 2002 WL 34226966.
104. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, supra note 103, at 12.
105. Order Granting Joint Motion for Final Approval of Settlement Agreement, In re Tyson
Foods Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1370 (M.D. Ga. 2011) (No. 4:07-md-01854-CDL).







due."' In In re Tyson Foods Inc., a Georgia district court recently ap-
proved a settlement of up to $17.5 million in back pay and up to $14.5
million in attorney fees."12
E. Colorado Wage Order 27
Most states also have their own minimum wage laws to govern the
conduct of their employers. The Colorado Minimum Wage Actil 3 prohib-
its employment of workers "for wages which are inadequate to supply
the necessary cost of living and to maintain the health of workers so em-
ployed" or "under conditions of labor detrimental to [workers'] health or
morals."' 14 The Act also allows the Colorado Department of Labor to set
minimum wage and maximum hour standards."' The Colorado Depart-
ment of Labor used this authority to issue Wage Order 27, which pre-
scribes minimum wage and overtime requirements for employees in the
retail, food and beverage, commercial support, and health and medical
industries." 6 Plaintiffs across the country have started to bring "hybrid"
suits that allege employer wage violations under both the FLSA and state
laws governing wage and hour law,"l 7 which is exactly the route taken by
the plaintiffs in Salazar.118
The plaintiffs in Salazar brought a claim under Wage Order 27,
which covers workers in the "food and beverage industry," supporting
their claim with the argument that the Butterball plant produces food for
consumption." 9 The Tenth Circuit agreed with Butterball that Wage Or-
der 27 only applies to retail-type food and beverage employers and not to
"wholesale or industrial" workplaces like the Butterball facility, choos-
ing to strike down the state law claim. 120
Some practitioners argue that claims under state wage statutes
should be preempted by the FLSA,12' but at least one federal court of
appeals has held that the FLSA does not preempt state laws where those
laws offer more protection than the FLSA.12 2
111. Id.
112. Order Granting Joint Motion for Final Approval of Settlement Agreement, supra note
105.
113. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-6-101 to 8-6-119 (2011).
114. § 8-6-104.
115. § 8-6-106.
116. 7 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1103-1:1 (2011).
117. Anna Wermuth & Jeremy Glenn, It's No Revolution: Long Standing Legal Principles
Mandate the Preemption of State Laws in Conflict with Section 3(o) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 839, 841 (2010).
118. Salazar v. Butterball, L.L.C., 644 F.3d 1130, 1143 (2011).
119. Id
120. Id. at l144.
121. See Wermuth & Glenn, supra note 17, at 841-42.
122. Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir. 2010).
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II.SALAZAR V. BUTTERBALL, L.L.C.
A. Facts
The plaintiffs in this case, a group of workers at Butterball's plant in
Longmont, Colorado, alleged that Butterball failed to properly compen-
sate them under the FLSA for all of their hours worked.123 The Long-
mont processing plant produces turkey products, including cooked,
ready-to-eat turkey products. 124 Butterball purchased the plant from
ConAgra Foods in 2006 and retained the same hourly employees, man-
agement, and pay practices that ConAgra had used during its time at the
plant.125
There were two named plaintiffs in this case, Clara Salazar and
Juanita Ybarra. Ms. Salazar worked at the Longmont plant from 1981 to
2009. Ms. Ybarra had worked at the plant since 1978 and was employed
at the plant as of 2009 when Magistrate Judge Craig Shaffer initially
heard the case.126 Members of the class worked in the various areas of the
plant, including in the deboning, evisceration, packaging, and quality
assurance departments.127 Company policy required the employees to
wear various pieces of PPE while working in these areas of the plant,
which they had to put on before clocking in at the beginning of their
shifts.128 They were also required to remove and sanitize their PPE after
clocking out at the end of each shift.129
Generally, production employees wore PPE including frocks,
aprons, plastic sleeves, gloves, cotton glove liners, boots or overshoes,
hard hats, earplugs, and safety glasses.130 When working in the deboning
and evisceration areas, employees also wore mesh gloves, knife holders,
and arm guards.' ' ConAgra did not pay most employees for time spent
putting on and removing these articles of PPE, choosing to only pay em-
ployees in the "live hang unit" for donning and doffing time with twenty
extra minutes of pay per day.132 Butterball continued this practice and
only paid live hand employees for donning and doffing time.'33 However,
123. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1134.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Salazar v. Butterball, L.L.C., No. 08-CV-02071-MSK-CBS, 2009 WL 6048979, at *2 (D.
Colo. Dec. 3, 2009), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 965353 (D. Colo. Mar. 15,
2010) affd, 644 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2011).





132. Id, at 1134 n.2. "Live hanger" employees lift live poultry from the supply conveyer and
hang the birds by their feet from a shackle conveyor. See Occupational Safety & Health Administra-
tion, Poultry Processing Industry eTool-Plant Positions Glossary
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/poultry/glossary.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2012).
133. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1134 n.2.
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the live hang department was dissolved in 2008, and all remaining em-
ployees became known simply as "production employees." 34
The United Food and Commercial Workers Local 7 (UFCW 7) rep-
resented the production employees at the Longmont plant. 135 ConAgra
and UFCW 7 entered into two CBAs from 2005 to 2009 that outlined a
grievance process for employees to voice any complaints against Butter-
ball.13 1
On December 16, 2005, UFCW 7 filed a grievance claiming that
employees should be paid for time spent donning and doffing PPE.137
ConAgra denied the grievance and the union demanded arbitration on
November 13, 2006.138 However, arbitration never occurred and the un-
ion never brought up the issue of payment for the donning and doffing of
PPE at either CBA negotiation.1 39
B. Procedural History
The plaintiffs filed suit against Butterball on September 25, 2008,
alleging that Butterball had failed to pay employees for all of their time
worked pursuant to the FLSA and Colorado Wage Order 27.140 Magis-
trate Judge Shaffer issued a recommendation and report on the case on
December 3, 2009, granting Butterball's motion for summary judgment
and finding that Butterball had not violated the plain language of the
FLSA.14 1 Judge Shaffer also held that and that Wage Order 27 did not
apply to the case.14 2 The United States District Court for the District of
Colorado adopted Judge Shaffer's report and recommendations. 14 3 The
plaintiffs appealed this judgment, and the Tenth Circuit issued its opinion
on July 5, 2011.144
C Opinion
Chief Judge Mary Beck Briscoe wrote the unanimous opinion of the
court, with Judge Stephanie Seymour and Judge Carlos Lucero partici-
pating in judgment and completing the three-judge panel for the Tenth
Circuit.14 5 The court affirmed the judgment of the district court and held
134. Id.




139. Id at 1135.
140. Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, No. 08-CV-02071-MSK-CBS, 2009 WL 6048979, *3 (D.
Colo. Dec. 3, 2009), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 965353 (D. Colo. Mar. 15,
2010), af'd, 644 F.3d 1130(10th Cir. 2011).
141. Id.at*l7.
142. Id.
143. Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, No. 08-CV-02071-MSK-CBS, 2010 WL 965353, at *12 (D.
Colo. Mar. 15, 2010), af'd, 644 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2011).
144. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1130.
145. Id at 1133.
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that Butterball was not required to pay any of its employees for time
spent donning and doffing PPE because that time is excluded from
"hours worked" under § 203(o) of the FLSA.14 6 The court also held that
because it chose to base its ruling on § 203(o) rather than on whether
donning and doffing is "work" under the FLSA, the court did not have to
determine whether the Supreme Court's holding in IBP affected the
Tenth Circuit's holding in Reich.147
The court begins its analysis by stating that the definition of "chang-
ing clothes" under § 203(o) of the FLSA is ambiguous, which gives the
court the authority to resolve this ambiguity.148 The court holds that PPE
should be considered clothes because this "expansive" definition "makes
more sense" than a definition that would differentiate between normal
clothes and PPE or between PPE and other equipment.149 The court fur-
ther notes that the unique PPE worn by the plaintiffs in the case is not so
"cumbersome, heavy, or complicated" as to differentiate from regular
clothing, referencing its holding in Reich that donning and doffing non-
unique PPE is not "work.", 0o The court chose not to defer to the 2010
interpretation of § 203(o) by the DOL distinguishing "clothes" from
PPE, stating merely that the "persuasive power" of an agency decision is
diminished if the agency repeatedly alters its interpretation of a statute.
The court also held that the non-payment of donning and doffing
time was a "mutually accepted custom or practice" that became an im-
plied term of the CBA between the parties. The court concluded that
UFCW 7 "acquiesced in the continuation of that practice" when it failed
to bargain for payment for donning and doffing time in its 2008 CBA,
and that UCFW 7 has no legitimate argument as to why the court should
change this status quo.152
Furthermore, the court held that the workers could not appeal their
claim that they should also be compensated for mid-day donning and
doffing to take meal breaks because they failed to object to this aspect of
Magistrate Shaffer's summary judgment order.
146. Id at 1142-43.
147. Id. at 1136 n.3. The Tenth Circuit held in Reich that donning and doffing non-unique PPE
was not "work" under the FLSA in the context of Tennessee Coal rather than evaluating whether this
activity was integral and indispensable, the proper test under Alvarez. Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
474 F.Supp.2d 1240, 1246 (D. Kan. 2007).
148. Id.at1138.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1140.
151. Id.atll39.
152. Id.atll42.




1. National Employment Lawyers Association
The National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) submitted
a brief on behalf of the plaintiffs to highlight the importance of requiring
employers to pay employees for donning and doffing PPE.15 4 NELA ar-
gues that the FLSA offers necessary protection to "a vulnerable work-
force," including many immigrants who are less likely to enforce their
rights, and that this purpose should dictate interpreting § 203(o) to afford
the most protection possible to low-wage workers.'s
NELA also argues that the court should adopt the interpretation of
"clothes" used by the DOL. One important argument made by NELA is
that when Congress amended the FLSA in 1949 to include § 203(o), the
"clothes" Congress had in mind were those that workers in the bakery
industry changed into and took off in the 1940s.15 6 NELA and the DOL
argue that such clothes are nothing like the PPE worn in the meatpacking
industry today. 5 7 NELA implores the Tenth Circuit to adopt the narrow
definition of "clothes" used by the Ninth Circuit in Alvarez v. IBP be-
cause it is a "narrow, workable standard that effectuates the meaning of §
203(o) without overextending the meaning of 'clothes' such that the term
'would embrace any conceivable matter that might adorn the human
body, including metal-mesh leggings, armor, spacesuits, riot gear, or
mascot costumes. ',"158
2. United Food and Commercial Workers Union
The UFCW also wrote an amicus brief on behalf of the plaintiff
workers arguing against a finding that there was a "custom or practice"
of non-payment for donning and doffing at the Butterball plant. The
UCFW argues that this case does not demonstrate "waiver by acquies-
cence." 59
The UCFW cites a number of NLRB precedents holding that em-
ployers are not absolved of their duty to bargain collectively just because
certain subjects were "neither discussed nor embodied in any of the
154. Brief of the National Employment Lawyers Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plain-
tiffs-Appellants, Salazar v. Butterball, L.L.C., 644 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2011) (No. 1:08-cv-02071-
MSK-CBS), 2010 WL 4597212.
155. Id. at *3-4.
156. Id. at *6 (citing DEPUTY ADM'R NANCY J. LEPPINK, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR WAGE AND
HOUR Div., OPINION LETTER FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA), SUBJECT: SECTION 3(o) OF THE
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 203(0), AND THE DEFINITION OF "CLOTHES," 2010 WL
2468195).
157. Id. at *6-7.
158. Id. at *7 (quoting Alvarez v. IBP, Inc. 339 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2003)).
159. Brief of United Food and Commercial Workers International Union and United Food and
Commercial Workers Union Local 7R as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants, Salazar v.




terms and conditions of the contract."l 6 0 It argues that it would be a cir-
cular and superficial analysis of the rights guaranteed by the National
Labor Relations Act and the process of collective bargaining to simply
hold that silence on a particular issue by both employer and union can
create an implied CBA term.161
III. ANALYSIS
The interpretation of the term "changing clothes" under FLSA
§ 203(o) is an issue of first impression in the Tenth Circuit. Varying in-
terpretations of § 203(o) have now resulted in a circuit split between the
Ninth Circuit and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits. 162 fDistrict courts in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Illinois have
also sided with the view of the Ninth Circuit.' 63
The Tenth Circuit's opinion gives little weight to the purpose of the
FLSA, and it spends just four sentences discussing the DOL's interpreta-
tion of § 2 0 3 (o).64 The court fails to do a full analysis of the DOL's in-
terpretation under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 165 instead using a Tenth Cir-
cuit case, Pacheco v. Whiting Farms Inc.,16 6 to write off the DOL's posi-
tion "is not particularly well-reasoned."l 67 The outcome of Salazar hing-
es on the Tenth Circuit's uneasiness with the political nature of the
DOL's opinion letters, leading the court to its decision against applying
judicial deference in this case. However, this fear can be detrimental to
the effective functioning of the administrative state when it leads to deci-
sions like the one in Salazar.
The clear intent of the 2010 DOL Opinion Letter was to point out
that § 203(o) has little practical application to today's modem workplac-
es where employers, government regulations, and the nature of certain
jobs require many workers to wear PPE in order to perform those jobs.' 6 8
The DOL also explains that workers should be compensated for donning
160. Id. at *2 (quoting NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680, 683 (2d Cir. 1952)).
161. Id. at*13.
162. See Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1140-41 (holding that poultry workers' PPE were clothes);
Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 614-15 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that frozen food workers'
uniforms and PPE, including hair nets, safety glasses, ear plugs, and hard hats, were clothes);
Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427, 428 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that meat production
workers' boots, hard hats, smocks, and hair nets were clothes), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 933 (2011);
Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 215-18 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that poultry
workers' PPE were clothes); Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 955-56 (11th Cir. 2007)
(holding that poultry workers' PPE were clothes); Bejil v. Ethicon, Inc., 269 F.3d 477, 480 n.3 (5th
Cir. 2001) (holding that lab coats, hair covers, and shoe covers were clothes).
163. In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d 368, 385 (M.D. Pa.
2008); Gonzalez v. Farmington Foods, 296 F. Supp. 2d 912, 930-31 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (using Alvarez
as persuasive authority to find poultry workers' sanitary and safety equipment were not "clothes").
164. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1139.
165. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
166. 365 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004).
167. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1139.
168. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage and Hour Div., FLSA2010-2, Section 3(o) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(o), and the definition of"clothes." *2 (2010).
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and doffing time because it often occurs after "clothes changing," which
can be a principal activity that starts the compensable workday under
IBP.169
Congress delegated power to the DOL, under the guidance of the
President, to issue this kind of interpretive policy statement. The DOL is
entitled to a full evaluation of its position under Skidmore, an analysis
the Tenth Circuit did not complete in Salazar. A closer look at the
DOL's position under the framework of Skidmore reveals that the DOL
presents a well-reasoned, expert opinion that it intends to have broadly
applicable effect. The unfortunate consequence of the court's refusal to
consider deference to the DOL is that it allows unionized employers to
continue to exploit the "custom or practice" language of § 203(o) to es-
cape their obligations under the FLSA. With this kind of judicial distrust
of agency policymaking, the best option for the DOL to protect employ-
ees from this exploitation is to use notice and comment rulemaking to
secure more judicial deference.
A. The Court's Definition of Clothes Does Not Reflect the Goals of the
FLSA or the Holding of IBP
The purpose of the FLSA is to protect workers' rights and promote
their safety, health, and well-being.o However, the Salazar court under-
cuts this purpose when it holds that excluding the donning and doffing of
non-unique PPE from compensable time under § 203(o) is appropriate
because this task is not "work.""'7 This assessment is problematic be-
cause it fails to take into account the integral and indispensable nature of
PPE in the poultry packing industry and the role PPE plays in keeping
employers compliant with OSHA and other safety regulations.
Payment for time spent properly donning safety gear should be re-
quired under § 203(o), not only because it serves the employer's goal of
maintaining a safe workplace, but also because donning and doffing PPE
is integral and indispensable to meat and poultry packing. Items of PPE
such as, metal gloves and arm guards are required by employers and the
law to perform many of the extremely dangerous jobs undertaken by
poultry workers, meaning that they are absolutely integral and indispen-
sable under the Steiner test to the tasks at hand.17 2 The PPE used in the
poultry industry are "necessary to the principal work performed and done
for the benefit of the employer," so the donning and doffing of these
items are principal activities themselves that must be included in the
FLSA's expansive definition of work. 7 1
169. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 30 (2005); id. at *3.
170. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981).
171. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1140.




The court's holding that PPE are clothes and should be excluded
from "work" fails to recognize the safety functions that separate PPE
from normal clothing and make the donning and doffing of PPE inher-
ently beneficial to an employer's goal of complying with safety regula-
tions. 17 4 The court fails to engage in a Steiner analysis of donning and
doffing PPE, even though it bases its holding on whether PPE are clothes
on whether or not they require "work" to don and doff, illustrating the
court's view that "work" has an important bearing on whether certain
items are "clothes." The court could have made a much more convincing
argument if it had used the Steiner test to determine if donning and doff-
ing PPE is "work" before incorporating any definition of work into an
interpretation of "clothes." This approach would have been firmly
grounded in the Supreme Court's holding in IBP rather than the outdated
Tenth Circuit holding in Reich, but the court chose to leave the resolution
of whether Steiner is now the proper standard for defining the principal
activities that constitute "work" for another case.175
The court also holds that because it does not take much time or ef-
fort to don and doff the unique PPE in this case-mesh gloves, arm
guards, and knife holders-it is not "work."1 6 This holding implies that
even if the court were to apply the Steiner test and hold that donning and
doffing the PPE is "work," it would still hold that the work is de minimis,
which would support the court's current view that PPE are more like
traditional clothing that do not require quantifiable work to don and
doff.177
Any future use of the de minimis doctrine to adjust the court's inter-
pretation of § 203(o) would undermine the major financial implications
of donning and doffing for employers and employees alike, as evidenced
by one of the WHD's largest settlements against an employer in the Per-
due Farms case.'78 The Supreme Court has previously recognized the de
minimis exception to compensable work, defining the concept in Ander-
son by stating that "[s]plit-second absurdities are not justified by the ac-
tualities of working conditions or by the policy of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act" and that it was "only when an employee is required to give up
a substantial measure of his time and effort that compensable working
time is involved."l 79 However, the Supreme Court has never fully de-
fined what constitutes a "split-second absurdity," leaving the federal cir-
cuit courts to determine when work is de minimis.8 0 Courts have found
activities to be de minimis anywhere from one to twenty minutes, but




178. See Greenhouse, supra note 33.
179. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946).
180. Richard L. Alfred & Jessica M. Schauer, Continuous Confusion: Defining the Workday in
the Modern Economy, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 363, 378 (2011).
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normally only activities that take fewer than ten minutes are de
- *  181minimis.
Time spent donning and doffing amounts to many hours annually in
the aggregate, constituting a huge amount of money per worker each
year. This amount of time is hardly a "split second absurdity" that should
be considered de minimis as a matter of law. Circuit courts are depriving
thousands of low-wage workers within their jurisdictions of millions of
dollars each year simply because they are applying different tests to de-
fine "work" and "clothing." These workers are the very employees the
FLSA was enacted to protect, and any minimization of the impact of
these donning and doffing wages does a disservice to the purpose of the
FLSA.
B. The Court Should Defer to the Department ofLabor's Interpretation
of§ 203(o)
1. The DOL Makes a Logical, Informed Opinion About the Defini-
tion of Clothes Which Merits Some Judicial Deference
Salazar hinges in the court's refusal to adopt the definition of
"clothes" outlined by the Department of Labor in its most recent Opinion
Letter on the FLSA.182 The DOL is charged with the enforcement and
interpretation of the FLSA, and should therefore receive some level of
deference from the courts where an ambiguous provision, such as the one
in § 203(o), is at issue. However, the Tenth Circuit does not even go
through a full analysis of the DOL's interpretation under Skidmore, giv-
ing only four sentences to its evaluation.' 83
The DOL Administrator's most recent interpretation of § 203(o) is
logically supported and serves the guiding purpose of the FLSA. The
DOL distinguished protective equipment from "clothes" as defined in
§ 203(o) and found that "the § 203(o) exemption does not extend to pro-
tective equipment [PPE] worn by employees that is required by law, by
the employer, or due to the nature of the job."8 4 The Ninth Circuit relied
on a similar definition of "clothes" in its decision in Alvarez.' The Al-
181. Id. (citing Green v. Planters Nut & Chocolate Co., 177 F.2d 187, 188 (4th Cit. 1949)
(applying de minimis rule to employees who reported up to ten minutes before start of shift to check
in and prepare for work); Frank v. Wilson & Co., 172 F.2d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 1949) (holding that 9.2
minutes per day consisting of 6.2 minutes of walking time and 3 minutes of other preliminary activi-
ties is considered de minimis); Lasater v. Hercules Powder Co., 73 F. Supp. 264, 271 (E.D. Tenn.
1947) (holding changing clothes and preliminary preparations for work were de minimis, although
not stating the amount of time preliminary activities took); McIntyre v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons
Co., 72 F. Supp. 366, 372 (W.D. Ky. 1947) (holding ten to twenty minutes per day going to locker,
exchanging uniform, changing uniform, and reporting to foreman within de minimis rule)).
182. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1139.
183. Id.
184. Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), FLSA2010-2, 2010 WL 2468195
(Dep't of Labor June 16, 2010), at *2.
185. Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2003).
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varez court took the definition of PPE straight from OSHA's own regula-
tions, which defines PPE as "specialized clothing or equipment worn by
an employee for protection against a hazard."'8 6
The DOL's analysis of the legislative history behind § 203(o) pro-
vides a thorough background for its distinction between normal clothing
and clothing used for protection against a hazard.187 In its analysis, the
DOL highlighted Congress's intent to limit the scope of section § 203(o)
by using the phrase "changing clothes" to limit the bill's original breadth,
which excluded "all activity performed under a [collective bargaining
agreement]" from hours worked for which the employer and union had
an express or implied agreement to do so. 1 88 Congress "narrowed the
scope of § 203(o)" because it wanted to allow the bakery industry to con-
tinue bargaining over the donning and doffing of clothing items like
aprons, as many bakeries had done throughout the 1940s.18 9 The DOL
argues that because these "clothes" worn by bakers were neither required
by law nor intended to protect against environmental hazards, PPE
should be categorized as something entirely different from traditional
clothes.190
A narrow definition of "clothes" that distinguishes between PPE
and regular work clothes allows employers to continue bargaining over
regular work clothes while protecting the safety interests of workers at
the same time.' 9 ' This definition also recognizes that PPE is required due
to the nature of the job and the legal requirements of OSHA and that the
donning and doffing of such equipment should be paid by the employer
because it is "work" under Steiner.19 2
Agency interpretations should be given some weight when they
have the power to persuade,193 and the DOL's interpretation of § 203(o)
deserves at least some deference under this standard because the DOL
has the highest level of expertise in the area of the FLSA and its statutory
definitions. Not only does the DOL's 2010 Opinion Letter protect em-
ployees more than any other interpretation, it is the first of the DOL's
interpretations on § 203(o) that is intended to have a broad application.1 94
Despite this emphasis that the 2010 interpretation provides more formal
and comprehensive guidance, the Tenth Circuit minimizes the fact that it
still owes some level of deference to the DOL under Skidmore.
186. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(b) (1999)).




191. Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 905 n.8.
192. See id. at 903.
193. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
194. Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), supra note 185, at *5. The DOL has
since issued multiple amicus briefs for employees in an attempt to secure more deference for its
letter.
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The U.S. Supreme Court held in Skidmore that the analysis of a
non-binding agency interpretation of a statute "will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."1 9 5 The
Tenth Circuit references only the last piece of this framework, stating
that "agency opinion letters are entitled to respect . . . to the extent that
they have the 'power to persuade."'l 96 The court appears to completely
ignore the first two elements of the analysis, the thoroughness of the con-
sideration and the validity of its reasoning, instead basing its decision
against giving deference on the consistency factor.' 97
Other circuits seem to have found a better balance between the fac-
tors. In a 2007 opinion analyzing the DOL's interpretations of § 203(o),
the Eleventh Circuit noted the following about the DOL's 2002 opinion
letter: "While less deference may be called for, the most recent advisory
opinion is entitled to some deference just the same. Moreover, this most
recent opinion provides a far more detailed rationale for its conclusion
than the previous opinions."l 9 8
In the alternative to granting deference, the Tenth Circuit created its
own definition of "clothes." Interestingly, the court goes through the very
same points of statutory analysis as the DOL's opinion letter. Both bod-
ies describe the legislative history of § 203(o) and the various definitions
of "clothes" created in other circuits. However, the Tenth Circuit ulti-
mately relied heavily on its outdated definition of when donning and
doffing is work from Reich to hold that non-unique PPE are "clothes"
because they are not "heavy, cumbersome, or complicated" such that
they should not be considered clothes. This line of reasoning misses a
crucial distinction articulated by the Sixth Circuit-defining something
as clothing does not affect whether that thing is still integral and indis-
pensable to an employee's work, meaning that donning and doffing that
"clothing" can still be a principal, compensable activity outside of the
exclusion offered by § 203(o). The DOL recognizes this distinction, and
it in fact separates its letter into two sections to emphasize the im-
portance of separating the concepts of PPE as clothing and the donning
and doffing of PPE as a principal activity.
The Tenth Circuit seems to convolute these two ideas when it con-
siders the issue of how much "work" is involved in donning and doffing
an item while creating a definition of "clothes." Instead of combining
these two ideas, the court should have determined whether donning and
doffing certain PPE is integral and indispensable before determining if
195. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
196. Salazar v. Butterball, L.L.C., 644 F.3d 1130, 1139 (2011).
197. Id.
198. Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 956-57 (11th Cir. 2007).
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the "changing clothes" exclusion under § 203(o) could apply to this case.
It is precisely this kind of confusion surrounding these two distinct issues
that warrants a ruling by the Supreme Court or a more binding interpreta-
tion from the DOL.
2. The Court's Characterization of the DOL's Shifting Stance on
§ 203(o) Reflects an Unnecessary Trend of Judicial Discomfort
with Agency Interpretations
One of the court's main arguments for choosing not to adopt the
DOL's interpretation of FLSA § 203(o) is that the "persuasive power of
the opinion" was diminished because the agency has repeatedly altered
its interpretation of a statute.199 However, this Tenth Circuit stance seems
to be in direct conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court, which has held that
"the fact that the agency has adopted different definitions in different
contexts adds force to the argument that the definition itself is flexible,
particularly since Congress has never indicated any disapproval of a flex-
ible reading of the statute." 200 The Court's disapproval of the DOL's shift-
ing interpretations seems to stem more from its discomfort with the cur-
rent pro-employee position of the DOL that PPE are not clothes rather
than any well-reasoned opinion that the DOL is no longer entitled to any
level of respect for its opinions.
The DOL's position on § 203(o) has shifted very clearly with the
political landscape of the DOL. During the Clinton era in 1997, the DOL
found that PPE were not "clothes," requiring employers to pay employ-
ees for time spent donning and doffing PPE. The DOL issued another
opinion letter on January 15, 2001, just two weeks before DOL Secretary
Alexis Herman was replaced by former President George W. Bush's
Secretary of Labor, Elaine Chao, that reiterated the same definition. In
2002, during the Bush Administration, an employer-friendly DOL shifted
its official position to give an advantage back to employers by "reconsid-
ering" the DOL's consistent interpretation of § 203(o). The most recent
shift back to the idea that PPE are not "clothes" came in 2010, after the
election of President Obama, who has ushered in a more employee-
friendly DOL administration under current Secretary of Labor Hilda
Solis.
The DOL announced on March 24, 2010, that going forward it
would no longer issue opinion letters based on specific factual predi-
cates, but "will set forth a general interpretation of the law and regula-
tions, applicable across-the-board to all those affected by the provision
199. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1139 (citing Pacheco v. Whiting Farms, Inc., 365 F.3d 1199, 1205
n.3 (10th Cir. 2004)).
200. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)
(noting that a change in an agency interpretation is not automatically invalidating); Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864 (1984) (deferring to change in agency's
opinion and noting that Congress has never disapproved of a flexible reading of a statute).
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in issue." 201 Thus, unlike previous letters, the Administrator's Interpreta-
tion was designed to provide formal, "comprehensive guidance." 202 It is
clear from the DOL's most recent letter that it intends for its 2010 opin-
ion to be the guideline for all employers going forward. The DOL uses
this opinion to recognize the fact that FLSA § 203(o) has been a political
sticking point in the past, and that it was in the best interest of workers to
issue a comprehensive opinion that speaks specifically to the needs of the
modem workplace.
The Tenth Circuit's argument that this more comprehensive guid-
ance does not deserve deference because it represents a shift in DOL
policy illustrates the court's failure to recognize the political nature of
the DOL and the necessity of shifting statutory interpretations to meet
the changing needs of the modem workplace. The court is entitled to
ignore the fact that the DOL is embroiled in a political battle rooted in an
uncertain economic future, but it should step forward with an interpreta-
tion that advances justice and accurately characterizes the state of immi-
grant labor disputes rather than scolding the DOL for inconsistencies.
The Court turns a blind eye to the serious and troubling marginalization
of unionized workers under § 203(o).
The court in Salazar treats these shifts in policy as though any cur-
rent DOL position on the issue of interpreting § 203(o) should be given
no deference whatsoever. However, this kind of political influence over
203
administrative agencies occurs with every shift of White House power.
The most recent DOL interpretation also states that the many opinions it
has issued on § 203(o) reflect the true ambiguity of the statute as well as
the DOL's choice not to issue a general guideline up until 2010. This
aspect of the Salazar decision appears to be largely influenced by the
shifting political ideologies of the DOL and the court's fundamental dis-
trust for this process.
Before her appointment to the United States Supreme Court, Justice
Elena Kagan wrote an article titled Presidential Administration that ex-
amined the transformation of the administrative state under President
Clinton.204 Justice Kagan argued in her article that President Clinton
brought the control of agencies closer to the office of the President than
ever before under what legal scholars call the "presidential control"
model.205 Clinton sought to accomplish what a sharply divided Congress
could not by instituting administrative policies to solve many of the na-
tion's problems.206 Justice Kagan argued that presidential influence over
201. Final Rulings and Opinion Letters, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WAGE AND
HOUR DIVISION, http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/opinion.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2012).
202. Id.
203. Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 955 (2003).
204. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2246 (2001).




agency policy allows for presidents to accomplish important social and
fiscal goals in an "expeditious and coherent" way without having to
wade through a "bureaucracy that hums along on automatic pilot." 20 7
Justice Kagan also predicted in her article that President George W.
Bush would not want to relinquish any of the political power over agen-
cies that Clinton had harnessed and exercised over his eight years as
president.208 This evolution of presidential administrative control resulted
in today's close bond between the policy and politics of the president and
the regulatory activities of agencies. 209 The heads of each agency do eve-
rything in their power to ensure that their actions while serving for the
president set them up to secure employment after the end of the admin-
istration, whereas the president is often interested in securing his place in
history and protecting the prospects of his party.210 This results in agen-
cies issuing a large number of policy statements, rules, and guidelines
just before a new cabinet takes office in an attempt to finish all the work
it undertook during the previous administration. 2 1 1 The DOL has fol-
lowed this trend of agency action during transitional periods, as evi-
denced by the timing of its opinion letters on § 203(o) of the FLSA.
Justice Kagan called for courts to embrace the expeditious and effi-
cient aspects of presidential administration by granting increased defer-
ence to interpretations issued by executive agencies, thereby linking def-
erence with presidential involvement in agency policy and promoting the
President's role in "neglected areas of regulation."212 Justice Kagan noted
that the Chevron deference rule had its "deepest roots" in the idea that
agencies are instruments of the President, and they are "entitled to make
policy choices, within the gaps left by Congress, by virtue of his relation-
ship to the public." 2 13 Furthermore, Justice Kagan argued that "a focus on
presidential action would reverse in many cases the courts' current suspi-
cion of change in regulatory policy." 2 14
Judicial recognition of the benefits of presidential control seems
aptly suited to the DOL and the issue of "changing clothes." This recog-
nition would have two extremely important benefits. First, it would coun-
teract the courts' suspicion of the shifts in DOL policy over the defini-
tion, which has thus far caused all but the Ninth Circuit to find that the
DOL's opinion letters do not deserve deference because of its shifting
stance. Secondly, it would allow the DOL to secure more deference for
its current interpretation without having to resort to notice and comment
207. Id. at 2339.
208. Id. at 2317
209. Id. at 2248.
210. Beermann, supra note 203, at 958.
211. Id. at 955.
212. Kagan, supra note 204, at 2376-78
213. Id at 2373.
214. Id. at 2378.
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rulemaking, which is something that will allow the DOL to change its
215
position as the modem workplace evolves and new views emerge.
If a case dealing with donning and doffing as work or the definition
of "changing clothes" reaches the Supreme Court again, as it likely will,
the court should consider following the deferential path laid out by Jus-
tice Kagan. The DOL needs respect from the judiciary to continue devel-
oping policies to protect employees, and it would be better able to ac-
complish these goals without having to submit each and every interpreta-
tion to notice and comment in order to secure Chevron deference.216
C. The Court's Broad Definition of "Custom or Practice" Gives Em-
ployers an Unfair Advantage, Especially Given the Unsettled Issue of
Whether Donning and Doffing Is a Principal Activity in the Tenth
Circuit
The issue of whether donning and doffing is a principal activity has
not been addressed in the Tenth Circuit since Reich, which was decided
long before IBP. Given that Reich is still the controlling case in the cir-
cuit on the definition of "work," excluding the donning and doffing of
non-unique PPE from compensable activities, the Tenth Circuit makes a
rather circular argument when it holds that UCFW 7 "acquiesced" to a
practice of non-compensation that UCFW 7 had no reason to think it
could challenge as inconsistent with the law. 217
Collective bargaining is an extremely complicated process that in-
volves an incredible amount of strategy and preparation for even the
simplest of issues. The court's discussion of "custom or practice" implies
that if payment for donning and doffing were a real issue for the employ-
ees, it would have been discussed at negotiations.218 However, this stance
ignores the fact that the employees affected by § 203(o) are usually all
low-wage workers who face a constant fight to get employment benefits
that many people take for granted, such as cost of living salary increases
and employer contributions to health insurance. Unions must pick and
chose their battles at every negotiation, so it makes little sense for the
court to require employees to bargain for the compensation of donning
and doffing time that may or may not be afforded to them under Tenth
Circuit law. Just because a vulnerable employee group fails to bring the
issue of donning and doffing time to the bargaining table should not
mean that Butterball automatically receives the upper hand under the
"custom or practice" exclusion under § 203(o).
215. Id..
216. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)
(explaining how courts should evaluate legally binding agency interpretations).
217. Salazar v. Butterball, 644 F.3d 1130, 1142 (2011).
218. Id. at 1141-43.
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The court holds that UCFW 7's failure to bargain for paid donning
and doffing time signals the employees' "acquiescence" to Butterball's
"custom or practice" of non-payment for this activity. The court supports
this argument with one of the key principles of the collective bargaining
process-employers like to maintain the status quo. Employers typically
combat employee requests for more benefits by sticking to what the em-
ployees accepted in the last contract negotiation. It can often be very
hard for employees to get some kind of new benefit if the employer can
argue that the employees were satisfied without that benefit in the past.21 9
In Salazar, the court uses the status quo to point out that employees
must bargain to get the right to compensation for donning and doffing,
just as the employer would have to bargain over a change if it had estab-
lished a practice of paying for this activity. However, this concept as-
sumes that § 203(o) is a subject of bargaining, even if the parties never
discussed the issue or considered it to be a bargaining issue. This as-
sumption is problematic because it means that unionized employees do
not have the same rights to compensation under the FLSA for donning
and doffing PPE that non-unionized employees do unless they bargain
for them. It seems quite far-fetched that the drafters of § 203(o) intended
to give unionized employees fewer rights, especially when the legislative
history of the statute indicates that Congress merely wanted to allow
220bargaining if the parties wanted to engage in such a process.
In fact, UCFW 7 makes this argument on behalf of the employees
that § 203(o) essentially requires that they bargain for compensation for
which they would otherwise be entitled to under the FLSA. The court
discredits this argument, saying that it ignores the fact that § 203(o)
makes donning and doffing time a subject of bargaining rather than a
guaranteed statutory right. The court offers no authority to back up this
proposition, which directly contradicts the legislative history of § 203(o)
as described above.
Other courts have taken broader approaches to the issue of acquies-
cence by recognizing that the issue warrants an evaluation of whether
payment for donning and doffing has been actually discussed by the par-
ties on prior occasions.2 2 1 In fact, a Colorado district court decision cited
in UCFW 7's amicus brief held that the absence of a CBA term for pay-
219. See Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 121 NLRB 953, 959-60 (1958) (in failing to
pursue subject matter of workload, "union was simply trading off one demand in return for conces-
sions on another, which is an everyday occurrence in collective bargaining having no relation what-
soever to an asserted 'management prerogative' position by an employer and the union's acquies-
cence therein").
220. Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), supra note 184, at *2.
221. Figas v. Horsehead Corp., No. 06-1344, 2008 WL 4170043, at *14 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 3,
2008) (citing Kassa v. Kerry, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1071 (D. Minn. 2007) ("Indeed, to the
extent that the union members never raised the issue even among themselves, this may suggest that
they did not knowingly acquiesce in [the employer's] policy of non-payment for clothes-changing
time.").
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ment for the time spent donning and doffing is not the equivalent of a
custom or practice of non-compensation over an eleven-year bargaining
relationship.2 22 The Tenth Circuit does not address any of the case law
cited by UCFW 7.
The court gives little weight to the employees' arguments that
§ 203(o) was never intended to give them less of a right to compensation
in the absence of collective bargaining over that compensation. The
Tenth Circuit's holding that UCFW acquiesced to non-payment of don-
ning and doffing is quite weak, especially when it is clear the UCFW
filed a grievance objecting to this practice on December 16, 2005, only
one month after the Supreme Court issued its holding in IBP. 223 The
Tenth Circuit's approach to the "custom or practice" language in
§ 203(o) gives employers an unfair advantage by requiring unionized
employees to bargain for rights they should already be entitled to under
the FLSA.
D. The Supreme Court Should Defer to DOL's Interpretation of§ 203(o)
Absent any legislative action on the part of Congress or the DOL,
the U.S. Supreme Court should give deference to the DOL's current in-
terpretation of § 203(o) using the modified Chevron deference model
described by Justice Kagan.22 4 In the alternative, it should evaluate the
interpretation using Skidmore, which also warrants a ruling of deference
to the DOL.
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Alvarez that PPE are not clothes,
which the DOL cites in its 2010 letter, reflects that court's understanding
that PPE is integral and indispensable to work in the poultry industry,
making donning and doffing that PPE different from donning and doffing
typical clothing. 225 The Ninth Circuit typically interprets employment
and labor laws with much more deference to the interests of employees
and more emphasis on protecting their rights than any other circuit, and
the split created by this issue illustrates that tendency. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's failure to interpret "clothes" under § 203(o) using the integral and
indispensable standard for activities that are "work" shows the Tenth
Circuit's misunderstanding of how these concepts interact. The Supreme
Court should give more weight to the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
§ 203(o) because it is more cognizant of the purpose of the FLSA and it
uses a standard for defining "work" that the Court has already approved.
222. See Brief of United Food and Commercial Workers International Union and United Food
and Commercial Workers Union Local 7R as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra
note 159 at *5 (citing Rogers v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 2010 WL 1904516 (D. Colo. May 11,
2010)).
223. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1134.
224. See Kagan, supra note 204, at 2376-79.
225. Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court should give deference to the exper-
tise of the DOL and the well-reasoned position of its 2010 opinion letter.
All but one of the courts of appeals cases cited by the Tenth Circuit were
decided before the most recent DOL opinion letter was issued on June
16, 2010, with several of the courts noting that their definitions of
"clothes" were consistent with the current interpretation of the DOL.226
This recognition of the DOL's expertise and entitlement to deference by
other courts stands in stark contrast to the four-sentence treatment the
Tenth Circuit gave to the issue in Salazar. In fact, the Sixth Circuit de-
votes more than two full pages to its Skidmore analysis, analyzing the
legislative history of the FLSA, the plain language of § 203(o) itself, and
the varying interpretations issued by the DOL before reaching a decision
on the deference issue.227
The Court should also give deference to the DOL as a matter of
public policy. The FLSA was enacted specifically to protect low-wage
employees who may not be willing to speak up about unfair labor prac-
tices because they fear that they will lose their jobs. The issue of pay-
ment for donning and doffing time may seem like a fairly insignificant
matter, but it becomes truly enormous when one considers that employ-
ers have the deck stacked against immigrant workers in the meatpacking
industry. These employees perform an extremely dangerous type of la-
bor, and they deserve to be paid for all of their work. The DOL is at-
tempting to make sure these employees are compensated, but it needs the
support of the courts to recognize and enforce its interpretations.
CONCLUSION
Courts are entitled to make independent, factual determinations
about whether or not an agency interpretation deserves deference, and
the Supreme Court may well address this deference issue if it grants cer-
tiorari in a donning and doffing case that includes the § 203(o) issue.
However, the circuit split surrounding the definition of clothes in
§ 203(o) and the resulting judicial discomfort with this "gyration" should
be enough to indicate to Congress that it should reevaluate this section of
the statute and amend or supplement it for purposes of clarification and
fairness to the employees it governs.
In the event that the Supreme Court chooses not evaluate § 203(o),
Congress should act to clarify the provision, which has not been amend-
226. See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 615 n.3 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that although
the court's holding that PPE are clothes is inconsistent with the 2010 DOL letter, the Ninth Circuit,
and several district courts, it is consistent with Spoerle); Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614
F.3d 427, 428 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that § 203(o) issue decided based on reasoning of Sepulveda,
despite being issued on Aug. 2, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 933 (U.S. 2011); Sepulveda v. Allen
Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 216 n.3 (4th Cir. 2009) (stressing that the decision complies with
the DOL Opinion Letters of 2002 and 2007); Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 956 (11 th Cir.
2007) (noting that the court's holding is consistent with the 2002 DOL Opinion Letter).
227. Franklin, 619 F.3d at 614-16.
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ed since its creation in 1949. As the number of low-wage and immigrant
workers in the United States increases every year, the need for clarifying
legislation to protect these workers and ensure they receive fair wages
only increases as well. The recent flood of donning and doffing litigation
signals that the modem workplace requires a fresh evaluation of the term
"changing clothes" and the continuing viability of § 203(o). Ultimately,
the aggregate compensation for donning and doffing time is worth an
incredible amount of money to employers and employees alike, and there
does not appear to be an end to this legal battle without intervention.
The Tenth Circuit failed to uphold the employee protections of the
FLSA when it interpreted § 203(o) in a way that allows employers to
continue to exploit the work of a vulnerable, largely immigrant work-
force. Conversely, the DOL has attempted to protect this workforce and
ensure that its members are compensated fairly, but it faces a wall of
judicial discomfort with its methods that can only be altered by the ex-
ample of the Supreme Court. While it is clear the issues of donning and
doffing and changing clothes have become a major sticking point for
employers across the country, it remains to be seen if Congress and the
Supreme Court will take the measures necessary to translate these as-
pects of the FLSA for application in the modem workplace.
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